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“SIMPLIFY YOU, CLASSIFY YOU”: STIGMA,
STEREOTYPES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS
Michael L. Perlin∗
INTRODUCTION
Before becoming a professor, I spent thirteen years as a
practitioner, mostly representing criminal defendants with mental
disabilities and persons subjected to involuntary civil commitment or
committed to psychiatric hospitals. I have taught mental disability
law for twenty-five years, and in the past eighteen of those years, my
research and scholarship has focused mostly on what I call “sanism”1
and on what I call “pretextuality,”2 shorthand for the ways that
prejudice towards persons with mental disabilities leads to stigma and
stereotyping, and the ways that these factors malignantly distort both
the legislative and judicial processes.3 I believe that these factors are
constant whether the topic is commitment, the right to refuse
treatment, sexual autonomy, deinstitutionalization, any aspect of the
criminal trial process, from the determination of competency to stand
trial to the ultimate death penalty decision, or the relationship
between international human rights law and mental disability law.4 In
∗ Professor of Law, New York Law School. Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform
Project. Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program. The author wishes to thank Jackie Halpern
and Lisa Ruff for their excellent research assistance, and Laura Rothstein, Mark Weber, and Theresa
Glennon for their helpful advice. A much earlier version of this paper was presented at the Third AngloAmerican Symposium on Special Education & School Reform at Cambridge University, England, June
10, 2004.
1. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993).
3. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, ‘Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth’: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and
How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 3 (1999).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); Michael
L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould, & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 80 (1995); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions
and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in
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this paper I consider the question of the extent to which these factors
and these principles do or do not equally contaminate the special
education process, and the decision to label certain children as
learning disabled.5 I begin with my ultimate thesis: The process of
labeling children with intellectual disabilities is not merely a doubleedged sword; it is at least a triple-edged and perhaps a quadrupleedged (or quintuple-edged) one. It is essential that policy makers
acknowledge this in any recalibration of statutory standards or
educational policy “reforms” that are undertaken. If we ignore these
conflicting issues, barriers, and dilemmas, we run the risk of recreating a system that unnecessarily stigmatizes and fails to provide
adequate services to those who need them.
In coming to these conclusions, I have identified five conflicts and
clusters of policy issues that we must consider:

Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114 (1996); Michael L.
Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (1993–1994); Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is
Good, You’ll Find out When You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with
Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
235 (2001–2002); Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2002-2003); Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My
Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005); Perlin, supra note 2; Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist
Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence,
8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is
Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 201 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability
Law: The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV. 69
(2006); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability Law:
The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333 (2006–2007).
5. I am no stranger to this area of the law. During my years as a mental health advocacy lawyer, I
also spent two years as Acting Director of the Advocacy for the Developmentally Disabled Project
Office of the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, and special education cases were among
the core caseload of that office. When I was Special Counsel to the Commissioner of the Public
Advocate Department, I filed a brief with the United States Supreme Court in Irving Independent School
District v. Tatro, which held that the provision of clean intermittent catheterization was a “related
service” to which the plaintiff was entitled under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act
(EHA). 468 U.S. 883, 895 (1984). Finally, in my first years of full-time teaching, I directed New York
Law School’s Federal Litigation Clinic. In that position, I supervised students who represented children
with disabilities at special education hearings before New York State administrative law judges.
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The need to ensure that all children receive adequate
education;
The need to ensure that the “cure” is not worse than the
“illness”; that is, that the labeling of a child as being in
need of special education services does not ensure that the
child will forever be seen as a second-class citizen;
The need to consider the ultimate impact this decision may
have if the child eventually winds up in the criminal justice
system;
The need to consider the relationship between the decisionmaking in this system and issues of gender, social class,
and race; and
The need to consider the public’s attitude that a learning
disability label is an advantage to a child competing for
admission to a prestigious university or graduate school.

I believe that it is essential to consider each of these—both
separately and in context with each other—if we are to make some
sense of the underlying problems and issues.
My paper will proceed in the following manner. In Part I, I will
briefly trace the history of American federal legislation and special
education law reform in the American courts. In Part II, I will
consider some of the “real life” problems that create pitfalls in the
implementation and enforcement of those laws. In Part III, I will look
at the meanings of “sanism” and “pretextuality” in an effort to
illuminate the insidious ways that stereotyping drives decisionmaking. In Part IV, I will consider issues of race and social class,
looking specifically at the connection between these issues, sanism
and pretextuality, and the implications of that connection for the
purposes of this inquiry. In Part V, I will consider the unique
relationship between special education labeling and the criminal
justice system, paying particular attention to the important
implications of the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in
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Atkins v. Virginia,6 which bars the execution of persons with mental
retardation. In Part VI, I will look at the way that special education
labeling is seen as somehow different from other types of labeling,
noting that some upper-middle class and upper class families
sometimes view the label as a strategic or tactical advantage. Finally,
I will conclude with some modest recommendations.
My title comes from Bob Dylan’s classic (though never heard
today) masterpiece, All I Really Want to Do.7 In it, Dylan pours out a
litany of what he does not want to do to the object of his affections,
opening with this verse:
I ain’t lookin’ to compete with you,
Beat or cheat or mistreat you,
Simplify you, classify you,
Deny, defy or crucify you.
All I really want to do
Is, baby, be friends with you.8

I expect that what we have done, and what we continue to do to
learning disabled children, is precisely what Dylan promised not to
do: “Simplify you, classify you.”9 Writing about this topic, Professor
Peter David Blanck has said: “Over the course of the twenty-first
century, our challenge is to strive toward national policies that
promote inclusion of all persons, with and without disabilities, based
on values of individual worth, fairness, and justice.”10 I write this
paper to make us think a bit about the past errors of our ways and
seek to bring us incrementally closer to Professor Blanck’s vision and
aspirations.
6. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
7. BOB DYLAN, All I Really Want to Do, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records
1964). Dylan last sang the song live on December 3, 1978. Adam Selzer, How Long Has It Been Since
Dylan Played?, http://bobdylan.com/links/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
8. DYLAN, supra note 7.
9. On the necessity of classification so that schools can fulfill federal mandates, see Patrick
Linehan, Guarding the Dumping Ground: Equal Protection, Title VII and Justifying the Use of Race in
the Hiring of Special Educators, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 179, 188 (2001).
10. Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 217 (2001).
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I. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY11
Two federal cases set the stage for the first important federal
education legislation on behalf of children with disabilities:
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v.
Pennsylvania, a consent decree stating that the denial of educational
services to children with mental retardation violated the Equal
Protection Clause,12 and Mills v. Board of Education, holding that the
exclusion of children with disabilities from public school programs
violated the Due Process Clause.13 These two cases were frequently
cited by Congress as sources of inspiration for subsequent
ameliorative legislation.14
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no
general federal constitutional right to education.15 In so declaring, the
Court, per Justice Powell, concluded that while a proper education is
a laudable policy goal, it does not rise to constitutional dimensions.16
This decision further led advocates to turn to legislation as the
appropriate remedy for inadequate education.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA)17 — the predecessor to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)18 — was an “ambitious congressional

11. This section is partially adapted from 5 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
13C-1, at 26-27 (2d ed. 2002).
12. 334 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
13. 348 F.Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972).
14. Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Confronting Barriers to the Education of Students with
Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1993).
15. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
16. Id. at 36. But see id. at 37 (“[N]o charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”) (emphasis added).
17. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482).
18. Id. For a helpful review, see Stanley S. Herr, Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 35 MENTAL RETARDATION 131 (April 1997). Despite EHA’s name change to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990, the basic principles of EHA are embodied
in IDEA. See, e.g., Rebecca Weber Goldman, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive
Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 243 (1994–1995).
AND CRIMINAL §
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attempt”19 designed to ensure that all handicapped children have
available a free public education appropriately designed to meet their
unique and individual needs.20 As a remedial statute, it was written to
be applied broadly and construed liberally in favor of the provision of
such education to handicapped students.21 To be eligible for funds
under the Act, each state was required to establish procedures to
ensure that, “To the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped
children, including children in public or private institutions or other
care facilities, are educated with children who are not
handicapped.”22
To ensure the provision of such education, the implementing
regulations specified that each state educational agency “shall make
arrangements with public or private institutions (such as a
memorandum of agreement or special implementation procedures) as
may be necessary to insure that [this section] is effectively
implemented.”23 The comment to this regulation underscored the
point: “Regardless for other reasons for institutional placement, no
child in an institution who is capable of education in a regular public
school setting may be denied access to an education in that setting.”24
IDEA, the successor act, was designed to assure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free and appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services
19. Rabinowitz v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481, 485 (D.N.J. 1982).
20. See, e.g., Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
21. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Tex. 1981); see also S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d
342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981).
22. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612, 89 Stat. 773,
781 (codified as amended 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006)) (emphasis added); see also id. § 614, 89
Stat. 784 (providing that an educational agency’s funding application must include goal of enabling, to
the maximum extent practicable, handicapped children residing in institutions to participate in regular
education programs). For a helpful overview, see Judith Welch Wegner, Educational Rights of
Handicapped Children: Three Federal Statutes and an Evolving Jurisprudence, Part I: The Statutory
Maze, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 387 (1988); see also id. at 387 n.2 (listing then-recent pertinent scholarship);
Glennon, supra note 14; Omyra M. Ramsingh, Disciplining Children Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 155 (1995–1996); Daniel H. Melvin,
The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (1994-1995); Stephanie L.
Gill, Punitive Damages: Flying in the Face of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?, 100
DICK. L. REV. 383 (1995–1996).
23. 34 C.F.R. § 300.554 (1984).
24. Comment to 34 C.F.R. § 300.554 (1984).
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designed to meet their unique needs.25 It defines “special education”
as “specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a
child with a disability.”26 To create a free and appropriate public
education program for each disabled child, the IDEA requires a
multidisciplinary team, which includes the child’s parents, to develop
an Individualized Education Program (IEP).27 It states a clear
preference for educating children in the “least restrictive
environment,”28 and in a setting with their peers who do not have
disabilities whenever possible.29 Such children should be removed
from the regular classroom environment only when education in the
classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily with the use of
supplementary aides and services.30 The least restrictive environment
principle also requires that children be kept in the same public school
they would attend if not disabled, and as close as possible to their
homes, rather than in separate schools for disabled children.31
The Supreme Court subsequently explained why Congress enacted
prophylactic legislation:
When the law was passed in 1975, Congress had before it ample
evidence that such legislative assurances were sorely needed: 21
years after this Court declared education to be “perhaps the most
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); see generally Ronald Wenkart, The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and the Establishment Clause of The United States Constitution, 23
WHITTIER L. REV. 411 (2001-2002). Under the IDEA, a “child with a disability” is eligible for
assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A), (B) (2000). The disability can be “mental retardation, hearing
impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbance,
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning
disabilities.” Id. In additional to the disability and because of it, the child must require special education
and related services. Id. For children between the ages of three and nine “disability” can include
developmental delays. Id.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.340-.349 (1992). The IEP should set forth the child’s present educational
performance, detail annual goals and short term objectives for improvement in that performance, and
describe the special instruction and related services that will enable the child to meet those objectives.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1992).
28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2005). On the mental disability law sources of the
“least restrictive alternative” doctrine, see 1 PERLIN, supra note 11, § 2C-5.3 to 5.3e, at 417–34.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (2005).
30. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1992).
31. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 (1992).
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important function of state and local governments,” Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98
L.Ed. 873 (1954), congressional studies revealed that better than
half of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not
receiving appropriate educational services. § 1400(b)(3). Indeed,
one out of every eight of these children was excluded from the
public school system altogether, § 1400(b)(4); many others were
simply “warehoused” in special classes or were neglectfully
shepherded through the system until they were old enough to
drop out. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975). Among the most
poorly served of disabled students were emotionally disturbed
children: Congressional statistics revealed that for the school
year immediately preceding passage of the Act, the educational
needs of 82 percent of all children with emotional disabilities
went unmet.32

The IDEA—born in an effort to combat stigma33—focused on
individualized treatment and mainstreaming as its core
characteristics.34 The question that must be next considered is what
pitfalls have stood in the way of full enforcement of the Act, and the
implications of these pitfalls for policy in this area of the law.
II. PITFALLS AND PROBLEMS
I have identified five pitfalls that we must consider in our attempts
to understand the underlying issues:

32. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988).
33. Peter Blanck, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1811, 1814 (1999–2000).
34. The Ninth Circuit, by way of example, has held that an administrative law judge properly found
that the mainstreaming requirement under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400–1482, contains a legal
presumption in favor of placing students with disabilities in regular classes with students who are similar
in age. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.
1994). That presumption can be rebutted, however, by a showing that the student’s educational needs
require removal from the regular classroom. Id.
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The problem of insufficient funding;
The reality that local programs often prove disastrous
where children with intellectual disabilities are mingled
with children with serious behavioral problems;
The reality that children may still be isolated within
mainstreamed classes;
The fact that mainstreaming may help parents deny the
reality that their child does have a disability and is need of
special services; and
The possibility that mainstreaming may lead to the creation
of new stereotypes.

I will address each of these briefly.
First, there is no question that special education has been woefully
under-funded, and that there are no signs that this situation is
improving.35 One Congressman put it succinctly and accurately:
“[I]nsufficient funding for special education compromises the
education of every student.”36 Although courts have sought to remedy
these problems in individual cases,37 the problem is clearly systemic,
and shows no signs of diminishing.
What is so sadly ironic here is this: the issue of lack of funding
pre-dates the creation of special education law and continues to
dominate much policy discussion after more than three decades of
congressional action. In Mills v. Board of Education, the court found
that “the school system regularly excluded certain handicapped
children, using the justification that the school lacked funds to

35. See generally Perry A. Zirkel, NCLB: What Does it Mean for Students with Disabilities?, 185
ED. LAW REP. 805 (2004); Andriy Krahmal, Perry A. Zirkel & Emily J. Kirk, “Additional Evidence”
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R.
201, 221 (2003–2004).
36. Terry Jean Seligmann, An Idea Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education Legislation,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 783 n.128 (2001–2002) (quoting Congressman Michael Ferguson).
37. See, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep’t. of Educ. of Connecticut, No. CV 980492696, 1999
WL 74531 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1999) (affirming one year of compensatory education services to a
juvenile with mild mental retardation where school district had insufficient staff, funding, and resources
to provide adequate special education services).
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provide proper evaluation, personnel, and service,”38 and ruled that
because inadequacies of school funding could not “be permitted to
bear more heavily on the ‘exceptional’ or handicapped child than on
the normal child,”39 each child of school age was thus entitled to “a
free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the
degree of the child’s mental, physical or emotional disability or
impairment.”40 And today, budget problems continue to plague
school districts. As one commentator has noted, “Because of the
increasing number of special education children served in mainstream
settings, experts find that it is no longer possible for the states to
accurately divide expenditures between general and special
education.”41
Second, the problems faced in special education classes by
students with emotional disabilities are enormous. According to
Professor Theresa Glennon:
There can be little doubt that schools are failing their mission to
serve this nation’s emotionally disturbed children. Only a tiny
percentage of students identified as seriously emotionally
disturbed perform at or above grade level, and the evidence
shows that they fall farther behind each year they attend school.
These students also drop out of school at an alarming rate, much
higher than for any other exceptionality. Very few students who
are identified under the definition of seriously emotionally
disturbed improve enough to be decertified. The post-school
careers of these students are equally distressing: approximately
38. Philip W. Clements, Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley: The Supreme Court Takes a Conservative
Approach to the Education of Handicapped Children, 61 N.C. L. REV. 881, 883 (1982–1983)
(discussing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)).
39. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876.
40. Id. at 878.
41. Seligmann, supra note 36, at 783–84. See also, e.g., Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6
v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 262 (Mont. 2005) (on the relationship between budgeted costs for special
education and “quality education”). On the funding incentives for school districts to over-identify
students as learning disabled, see Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 447–48 (2004), and see also Theresa
M. Willard, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Influence of Funding
Formulas on the Identification and Placement of Disabled Students, 31 IND. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (1998).
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one-third are unemployed, and almost one-half of the youth out
of school for two years have arrest records.42

There have been few studies on the impacts of “co-mingling”
children with different disabilities. Statistics show that for the cases
identifiable in terms of the child’s disability, these classifications
were the most frequent: learning disability (27.4%), physical
impairment (22.3%), emotional disturbance (13.8%), and mental
retardation (20.1%).43 This issue is inextricably interlinked with the
politics of special education labeling. Among the reasons suggested
for the increase in the number of children categorized as having
learning disabilities is that this category is often viewed by parents
(and, perhaps, by school administrators) as less stigmatizing than
more antiquated labels like mild, or educable mental retardation,44 a
categorization known in some circles as the results of “classification
plea bargaining.”45 In short, this is a very culturally, socially, and
politically complex issue.46
Third, a debate continues to rage as to the amount of time students
with learning disabilities should spend in mainstreamed classrooms
as opposed to separate classrooms.47 While the IDEA mandates that
42. Glennon, supra note 14, at 305–06.
43. Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An Empirical Trends
Analysis, 161 ED. LAW REP. 731, 734 (2002).
44. Seligmann, supra note 36, at 770.
45. Alan Gartner & Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a Quality System
for All Students, 57 HARV. EDUC. REV. 367, 373 (1987).
46. It must be stressed that many students with learning disabilities who receive appropriate
accommodations are successful in academic programs. See Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Disabilities to
Exceptional Abilities: Law Students with Disabilities, Nontraditional Learners, and the Law Teacher as
a Learner, 6 NEV. L.J. 116, 122 (2005–2006) (“With advances in knowledge about education, including
knowledge about different learning styles, appropriate accommodations, strategies, and compensations
for both students with physical and learning disabilities, many students are matriculating through
undergraduate programs with a high degree of success.”).
47. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1236
n.165 (2003):
Indeed, a longstanding debate in special education circles concerns the question of the
relative amount of time disabled students should spend in mainstream as opposed to
separate classrooms. Special education experts cast the debate in terms of “inclusion”
versus “placement diversity.” Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Educational
Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC.
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children with learning disabilities be educated, wherever possible, in
a regular classroom, they may be educated outside of such
classrooms if mainstreaming would not provide a satisfactory
education program.48 Also, courts have held that academic
achievement is not the only reason for mainstreaming:
[O]ur inquiry must extend beyond the educational benefits that
the child may receive in regular education. We also must
examine the child’s overall educational experience in the
mainstreamed environment, balancing the benefits of regular and
special education for each individual child.49

The overwhelming majority of evidence, by way of example,
suggests that “language and role modeling from association with nondisabled peers are essential benefits of mainstreaming.”50
Yet there is still a smattering of case law that points out that there
may be negative side-effects of mainstreaming: that the child may
suffer interpersonally if she falls significantly behind her peers who
are not disabled,51 and that there may be services simply unavailable
in a mainstreamed setting.52 These are issues that cannot be ignored
in this investigation.

523, 536–45 (1996) (classifying proponents of inclusion as those who favor moving
existing special education services into mainstream settings, and supporters of placement
diversity as those who prefer to leave the question of placement up to the educators’
individual assessments). In the context of this debate, placing responsibility for the actual
provision of educational services in one set of hands makes sense as an implementation
matter, particularly where optimizing the mix of mainstream and separate instruction for
disabled students involves shuttling students between mainstream and specialized
classroom settings.
48. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2005).
49. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Ed., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989). The Daniel R.R. case is
discussed in this context in Michael Hazelkorn, Reasonable v. Reasonableness: The Littlegeorge
Standard, 182 ED. LAW REP. 655, 661–62 (2004).
50. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993). But see W. N. Bender, The Case
Against Mainstreaming: Empirical Support for the Political Backlash, 105 EDUC. 279 (1985) (arguing
the contrary view that mainstreaming of children with disabilities compromises the education of other
children, and discussing negative attitudes expressed by teachers and peers).
51. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991).
52. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. den., 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
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Fourth, the issue of denial of reality is a difficult one, and is
probably beyond the law’s reach, but there are some examples in the
legal literature that should force us to consider the potential impact of
this issue. One article quotes a letter from the parents of a child with
a learning disability to a New York state senator:
We admit that when she was around 4 years old that our goal
was to somehow get her mainstreamed—we thought it was best
for her, but actually as we ponder[ed] that thought—it was to
fulfill a need of ours—because if she was in a regular school
setting we would feel we did our part as parents giving her the
‘normalcy’ that she deserved.53

Another quotes a parent describing her daughter, “I was not willing
to accept the slow theory.”54 There is no evidence that these are
universal attitudes, but they, again, are ones that must be factored into
any analysis of the overarching issues that are at the core of this
paper.
Fifth, we need to consider the difficult question of whether new
stereotypes may be created, and if that happens, the relevance of that
phenomenon. It is black-letter law that “[p]rivate biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.”55 This, however, does not conclude the inquiry.
One commentator questioned, by way of example, how clients will
respond to lawyers that they believe were able to pass the bar only
because of special accommodations.56 For example, the “extra-time
on the bar” attorney may be stereotyped as needing more time to
work on a case than a “regular time” attorney, and a client may
53. Therese Craparo, Remembering the “Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 522 (2002–2003) (emphasis added).
54. W. Ray Williams, Hand-up or Handout? The Americans with Disabilities Act and
“Unreasonable Accommodation” of Learning Disabled Bar Applicants: Toward a New Paradigm, 34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 633 (2001–2002).
55. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 100–05. It may belabor the obvious to ask whether similar
questions as to the abilities of female or African-American attorneys would be taken even remotely
seriously.
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question the number of billable hours.57 Also, managers who consider
hiring workers with disabilities express concerns that “the disabled
worker’s personal needs will affect job performance.”58
Again, these attitudes cannot—and must not—stand in the way of
civil rights legislation on behalf of persons with disabilities. But
when we think about stigma and stereotypes, it would be shortsighted for us to Aput our heads in the sand@ and make believe that
these attitudes do not exist.
III. SANISM AND PRETEXTUALITY
As I already indicated, I believe that it is impossible to understand
anything about the way we construct persons with disabilities in the
community, the classroom, and the courtroom without understanding
the deep textures of sanism and or pretextuality.59
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
as other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.60
It permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders,
counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.61 Its corrosive effects have
warped mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil
commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the
57. See Williams, supra note 54, at 659.
58. Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 47 (1997).
59. See generally Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4.
60. See generally PERLIN, supra note 3. The classic study is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (1955). But see ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES (1996)
(questioning Allport’s conclusions). The word “sanism” was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by
Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 105 (Frank Ayd ed., 1974)
[hereinafter Birnbaum, Right to Treatment: Comments]; see also Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764
n.12 (2d Cir. 1978). Dr. Birnbaum is universally regarded as having first developed and articulated the
constitutional basis of the right to treatment doctrine for institutionalized mental patients. See Morton
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960), discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 11, § 3A2.1, at 8–12 (2d ed. 1999).
61. On the way that sanism affects lawyers’ representation of clients, see PERLIN, supra note 3, at
28, 55–56, and Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4, at 689–90.
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criminal process (pretrial, trial, and sentencing). It reflects what civil
rights lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized the “pathology of
oppression.”62
Sanist myths exert especially great power over lawyers who
represent persons with mental disabilities.63 The use of stereotypes,
typification, and deindividualization inevitably means that sanist
lawyers will trivialize both their clients’ problems and the importance
of any eventual solution to these problems. Sanist lawyers implicitly
and explicitly question their clients’ competence and credibility,64 a
move that significantly impairs the lawyers’ advocacy efforts.65
Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly
in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-making. In many
cases, courts allow witnesses, especially expert witnesses, to
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.
This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the
judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, “blasé” judging, and at
times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying.66 All aspects of mental
disability law are pervaded by sanism and by pretextuality, no matter
whether the specific presenting topic is involuntary civil commitment
law, right to refuse treatment law, the sexual rights of persons with
mental disabilities, or any aspect of the criminal trial process.67
Both sanism and pretextuality are further contaminated by our
reliance on non-reflective “ordinary common sense” (OCS). OCS is a

62. See Birnbaum, Right to Treatment: Comments, supra note 60, at 107 (quoting Kennedy); see also
id. at 106 (“It should be clearly understood that sanists are bigots.”). For a subsequent consideration in
this context, see Bruce G. Link et al., The Consequences of Stigma for Persons with Mental Illness:
Evidence from the Social Sciences, in STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS 87 (Paul Fink & Allan Tasman
eds. 1992).
63. See Perlin, supra note 1; Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4; PERLIN, supra note 3.
64. See generally PERLIN, supra note 3; Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4, at 684.
65. See Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000).
66. Michael L. Perlin,”She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and
the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003–2004).
67. Id.
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“powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making.”68 It is
“prereflective” and is susceptible to precisely the type of
idiosyncratic, reactive decision-making that has traditionally typified
all mental disability legislation and litigation.69 It is supported by our
reliance on a series of heuristics—cognitive-simplifying devices that
distort our abilities to rationally consider information.70
Our special education system is rife with sanism and pretextuality.
It relies on shopworn myths, creates stigma, and demands
reductionist deindividualization in textbook examples of sanism.
Whether we are looking at the impact of special education labeling,
the purported threat of disability classification “gaming,” the
relationship between special education and the criminal justice
system, or the relationship between special education and
socioeconomic questions of race and class, the specter of
pretextuality looms as a nearly unmovable presence. For the
remainder of this paper, I will address each of these issues.
IV. RACE AND CLASS
It is no surprise to learn that “[c]hildren of color are vastly over
represented in both the juvenile justice and special education
systems,”71 and that studies unanimously reveal that “race plays a
powerful role in the placement of children in special education”72 and
68. Id.; see also Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the
Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1988) (OCS exemplified by the attitude of “What I
know is ‘self evident’; it is ‘what everybody knows’”).
69. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” and
Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 29 (1990).
70. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 421–23 (2000); Perlin,
supra note 66, at 26–27; PERLIN, supra note 3, at 4–16. The use of such heuristics “allows us to willfully
blind ourselves to the ‘gray areas’ of human behavior.” Perlin, supra note 66, at 27.
71. Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back, Looking Ahead: The
Evolution of Children’s Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (1995) [hereinafter Glennon & Schwartz,
Looking Back]; see generally, Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled
Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237 [hereinafter Glennon, Race].
72. Matthew Ladner & Christopher Hammons, Special But Unequal: Race and Special Education, in
RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 107–08 (Chester E. Finn et al. eds., 2001)
(quoted in Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA, Getting Behind
No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of it All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 30 n.164 (2004)).
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exerts a “disparate impact” on such placements.73 In 1992, by way of
example, “blacks made up sixteen percent of public school students,
but represented nearly forty percent of those in ‘special’ education
classes”—classes for students with mental disabilities or other special
needs.74 And there are confounding interstate rate differentials. “[I]n
thirteen states, African-American students are at least three times
more likely than white students to be identified as having mild mental
retardation,” but “[i]n other states . . . African-American students are
identified as having mild mental retardation at rates much closer to
their presence in the student population.”75 To this end, we must also
recall the description of some special education classes as being the
end product of “classification plea bargaining.”76 Again,
considerations of race cannot be avoided.77
There are also gender issues to consider as well. Professor
Glennon points out:
When the special education identification and placement figures
are broken out by race and gender, a stark picture appears. Using
white female students as the baseline, African American boys are
the most overrepresented by very significant degrees in the
categories of mental retardation and serious emotional
disturbance. The race and gender disparities are striking: while
African American females are 2.02 times as likely as white

73. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools:
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 422 (2001).
74. Sharon E. Rush, Identity Matters, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 909, 919 (2002).
75. Glennon, Race, supra note 71, at 1253 (relying upon OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., 1992 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE REPORT: PROJECTED
VALUES (1992)).
76. Gartner & Lipsky, supra note 45, at 373.
77. On the subjectivity of some such judgments, see Regina Austin, Back to Basics: Returning to the
Matter of Black Inferiority and White Supremacy in the Post-Brown Era, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 79,
85 (2004). “For example, education researchers considering the disproportionate placement of black
students in special education have argued that labeling black students, particularly black males, retarded
or emotionally disturbed is highly subjective and may be based on white female teachers’
misinterpretation of or lack of tolerance for the students’ verbal, behavioral, or cognitive styles.” Id. On
gender issues, see infra text accompanying note 78.
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females to be identified as mentally retarded, African American
males are 3.26 times as likely.78

Beyond this, Glennon notes that “studies and litigation demonstrate
that African American males, once identified, are even more likely
than other special education students to be placed in separate classes
or separate schools which exert greater external controls over
them.”79 Professor W. Ray Williams thus concludes that:
The manner in which learning disabilities are defined and
diagnosed implicates race, economic and class-based
discrimination. When individuals, the benefactors of privilege
and class, perform poorly, it is assumed to be due to some
neurological or organic source. After all, as one commentator
observed, these children “are by cultural definition intelligent
and enjoy a presumption of intelligence because of their station
in society.” Similarly, poor children are by cultural definition
assumed dull, slow learners because of their place in the societal
hierarchy.80

It should be clear by now that we cannot consider learning
disability and labeling questions in a hermetic vacuum. Decisionmaking about learning disabilities inevitably implicates questions
about race, gender, and social status, and interacts with decisionmaking in the criminal justice system.81 Perhaps most important of
all, the decision to label a child as “learning disabled”—although
78. Theresa Glennon, Knocking Against the Rocks: Evaluating Institutional Practices and the
African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 10, 20 (2002) [hereinafter Glennon, Knocking]
(citing Donald P. Oswald et al., Community and School Predictors of Over Representation of Minority
Children in Special Education, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE CONFERENCE ON MINORITY ISSUES
IN SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 19,
http://www.dimenet.com/dpolicy/archive.php?mode=P&id=523(last visited, Feb. 12, 2009)).
79. Glennon, Knocking, supra note 78, at 20 (citing Glennon, Race, supra note 71, at 1255).
80. Williams, supra note 54, at 631 (quoting in part, Brian Mikulak, Classism and Equal
Opportunity: A Proposal for Affirmative Action in Education Based on Social Class, 33 HOW. L.J. 113,
118 (1990–1991)).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98.
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often the only way to make it even remotely likely that the child will
get educational services that provide him/her with “an appropriate
education”82—may have a negative, irreversible, and life-long impact
on the way the child thinks about herself (and her subsequent
behavior) both as a child and an adult in the full range of social
contexts.83 We cannot ignore this in our consideration of these issues.
V. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
There is no question that children with learning disabilities are
disproportionately over represented in the criminal justice system84
and remain at high risk in that system85 for a variety of reasons,
including judicial confusion between behavior and disabilities.
Studies suggest that at least 40-50% of all jail and prison inmates
have been classified as learning disabled;86 if undetected learning
disabilities are included, some estimates rise to 80%.87 Learning
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16).
83. My colleague Mark Weber notes: “Or it may be liberating. The student no longer blames himself
or is considered ‘stupid’ or ‘lazy’, and may—one hopes—learn some tricks to survive in the educational
system and beyond.” Personal communication with Mark Weber, St. Vincent DePaul Professor of Law,
DePaul University College of Law (April 28, 2007).
84. See generally Deborah Shelton, A Study of Young Offenders With Learning Disabilities, 12 J.
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 36, 40 (2006) (explaining that 38% of youth met diagnostic criteria for
learning disability; 22% had co-existing psychiatric disorder; of this category, more than one-third were
diagnosed with multiple psychiatric disorders); see also William S. Koski, Foreword: The Political
Construction of Youth Crime and Its Policy Consequences, 14.1 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 5, 6 (2003);
Note, Toward Reasonable Equality: Accommodating Learning Disabilities Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1560, 1573 n.90 (1998) (citing Stanley J. Antonoff, We Can Make a
Difference, in THE CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, DYSLEXIA AND OTHER LEARNING DISABILITIES
I, 2–3 (Stanley J. Antonoff ed. 1993)).
85. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The “Child” Grows Up: The Juvenile Justice System Enters Its Second
Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 589, 604 (1999).
86. Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17
S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 442 (1993); Philip J. Kinsler et al, The Vermont Defendant Accommodation Project,
10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 134, 159 (2004). On the question of concerns about the validity of such
classifications, see Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops? LearningDisabled Student-Athletes and the NCAA Initial Academic Eligibility Requirements, 66 TENN. L. REV.
1049, 1104-05 (1999).
87. Jane Babin, Adequate Special Education: Do California Schools Meet the Test?, 37 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 211, 286 n. 473 (2000) (citing Clyde A. Winters, Learning Disabilities, Crime Delinquency, and
Special Education Placement, 32 ADOLESCENCE 451, 451–60 (1997)). See also, Larkin McReynolds &
Gail Wasserman, Risk for Disciplinary Infractions Among Incarcerated Male Youths: Influence of
Psychiatric Disorder, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1174, 1175 (2008), citing Gail Wasserman et al, The
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disabled children are an astonishing “220% more likely to be
adjudicated delinquents than non-disabled youths.”88 Scholars have
speculated that at least one reason for this link may be the disability
itself:
Compounding this problem is the reality that characteristics
common to children with learning disabilities such as difficulty
in listening, thinking, and speaking often lead to
misinterpretation of a child’s behavior. As a result, a disabled
minor’s poor presentation in court or during interrogation may be
interpreted as dangerous, resulting in detention.89

Much of this has been well documented for years, but there is now
a new nuance which has received sparse attention90—the potential
relationship between a learning disability label and an individual
being subject to capital punishment. In the 2002 case of Atkins v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of people with
mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

Voice DISC-IV with Incarcerated Male Youth: Prevalence of Disorder, 41 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 314 (2002) (among incarcerated juveniles, the rate of mental illness rises to
as high as 65%).
88. Id. (quoting Francis T. Murphy, Learning Disabilities and the Courts: Taking a Stand Against
Indifference, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1996, at S1 (Justice Murphy, at the time, was the Presiding Judge of the
NY Appellate Division)).
89. Kathleen Kelly, The Education Crisis for Children in the California Juvenile Court System, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 760 (1999–2000); see also Peter E. Leone et al., Understanding the
Overrepresentation of Youths with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. REV. 389, 391–92
(1995). On the way that public fears about the purported link between mental illness and dangerousness
“drive the formal laws and policies governing mental disability jurisprudence,” see John Monahan,
Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992), as discussed in Perlin,
Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4, at 688 n.19.
90. But see Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 41 (2004) (reversing death penalty conviction in case in
which defense counsel had presented mitigating evidence that Smith had learning disabilities and an IQ
of seventy-eight which resulted in him being placed in special education classes). See also Holly
Geerdes & Nikki Cox, Death Penalty Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 479, 504 (2006) (discussing Smith v.
Texas in this context); Francine Banner, Rewriting History: The Use of Feminist Narratives to
Deconstruct The Myth of the Capital Defendant, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 598 (2000–
2001) (discussing capital sentencing and stating, “Other conditions that can lead to marginalization and
may best be explored through counter-narrative are mental difficulties and learning disabilities.”).
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against cruel and unusual punishment.91 The opening paragraph of
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion speaks to the question at hand:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law’s
requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and
punished when they commit crimes. Because of their disabilities
in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,
however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover,
their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of
capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants.92

In coming to its conclusion, the Court drew on evidence
persuading it that:
Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not
affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the decision of other
potential murderers . . . . Indeed, that sort of calculus is at the
opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded
offenders . . . . Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral
impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable—
for example, the diminished ability to understand and process
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely
that they can process the information of the possibility of
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct
based upon that information.93

91. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). I discuss Atkins in detail in Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors,
Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Mirrors], in
Michael L. Perlin, Recent Criminal Legal Decisions: Implications for Forensic Mental Health Experts,
in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING TOPICS AND EXPANDING ROLES 333 (Alan Goldstein ed., 2006),
and MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCULO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
(2008 Cum. Supp.), § 12-4.2b, at 124–36.
92. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
93. Id. at 320 (citing, in part, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).

Published by Reading Room, 2009

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6

628

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

Clearly, many persons with learning disabilities will fit into the
Court’s language in Atkins.94
Five years ago, I presented a paper on Atkins at the annual meeting
of the American College of Forensic Psychology in San Francisco,
California.95 After my presentation concluded, an audience member
(a forensic psychologist) approached me in the hall and told me this
story.96 He had been asked to consult with defense counsel on a death
penalty case in which the defendant’s IQ was clearly within the
mental retardation range, but in which the defendant had never been
classified as retarded or in need of special education. Puzzled, the
psychologist investigated and contacted the school system that the
defendant had attended. He was told that the decision to not so
classify the person in question was a deliberate one, in spite of the
fact that there was no question that he was, in fact, retarded.
The reasoning went like this: the individual was African-American
from an economically impoverished background and a shattered
nuclear family. It was likely that he was going to have so many
hurdles to face as he grew up, that, by avoiding the “mentally
retarded” label (and keeping him out of special education classes),
the school district was “doing him a favor” by placing one less
obstacle in his way.97 Now, given the Court’s finding in Atkins that
mental retardation involves “not only sub-average intellectual
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that bec[o]me manifest
94. The Court defined mental retardation as involving “not only subaverage intellectual functioning,
but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction
that became manifest before age 18.” Id. at 318.
95. Michael L. Perlin, Atkins for Experts (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presented in
April 2004).
96. I have no independent verification of the story, but I cannot fathom why he would tell me this if
it were not true.
97. Rebekah Gleason, Charter Schools and Special Education: Part of the Solution or Part of the
Problem?, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 145, 164 (2007) (discussing schools surveyed in a Department of
Education study used that “did not believe in labeling students as needing special education”); Moira
O’Neill, Delinquent or Disabled? Harmonizing the IDEA Definition of “Emotional Disturbance” with
the Educational Needs of Incarcerated Youth,57 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1207 (2006) (“[S]chools often use
. . . exclusionary language to avoid labeling students as emotionally disturbed, preventing intervention
and appropriate services while the youth is still in school.”).
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before age 18,”98 the fact that there is no record of the defendant
manifesting these characteristics before that age may ultimately lead
to his death.
I raise this here because it suggests to me how confounding any
inquiry into all of the potential outcomes of a labeling decision, (or
non-decision,) may be. No decisions in American courts are truly
politics-free. The school district officials who declined to categorize
the person to whom I just referred to as “mentally retarded” thought
they were doing him a favor, and presumably were acting with
munificent intentions. And they overtly premised their decision on
political grounds. Yet, the implications of this decision could be the
most profound of any decision-maker in American society—even
though motivated by altruism, it could cost the individual his life.99
VI. LABELING AND GAMING
Over the years, scholars devoted much attention to what is
commonly referred to as “labeling theory.” They concluded that,
when individuals are labeled as social deviants, labeling can often
lead to social ostracism, social fragmentation, and social conflict.100
The “very pattern of identification has consequences for the labeled
person that are difficult to escape and contribute to recurring patterns
of exclusion and deviant behavior.”101 Or, to put it simply, “the label

98. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
99. This conundrum may be one to inspire further inquiry from the perspective of therapeutic
jurisprudence and its relationship to the criminal law. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS. L. REV. 743
(2005); DAVID B. WEXLER, REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (2008); David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Criminal Law, Research, and Practice, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 95
(2005); Astrid Birgden & Tony Ward, Pragmatic Psychology Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Lens, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 334 (2003).
100. Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 n.63 (2003) (citing Douglas
Raybeck, Anthropology and Labeling Theory: A Constructive Critique, 16 ETHOS 371, 376 (Dec.
1988)).
101. Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal
Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 169 (1987).
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of one as a deviant furthers one’s self-identification as a deviant.”102
As Professor Martha Minow has noted, “The effect of others’ views,
when those views assign the label of deviance, may well cause the
individual to internalize that label, and feel degraded.”103 “The
labeling theory approach emphasizes the community’s responsibility
in assigning that label and attributing particular meanings of
exclusion to it.”104 On the specific question of labeling and mental
disability, she added:
As used in the past by advocates for reform of the treatment of
the mentally disabled, labeling theory focused attention on the
majority that both assigned the label of mental incompetence and
created the label’s exclusionary effect. The approach contended
that some of the characteristics used to support the label were
either figments of the majority’s imaginations, or responses of
the labeled person to the effect of the label. These advocates did
not assert that mental disability is itself fictional, but instead
challenged particular consequences of the label’s application.105

According to Matt Cohen, a special education attorney:
The label becomes a scarlet letter branded on the person’s
identity, shaping people’s assumptions and provoking their
prejudices. The labels shape people’s assumptions about a
person’s intellectual ability, about their personality, about their
aspirations. In the school environment, the child’s label may
have a significant impact on the teachers’ expectations for that
child. Similarly, a particular label may have a profound impact
on a parent’s perception of their child.106

102. Darryl Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1358 (2001).
103. Minow, supra note 101, at 170 (citing EDWIN PFUHL, THE DEVIANCE PROCESS 213 (1980)).
104. Id. at 171.
105. Id. at 170–71.
106. http://www.ldonline.org/legal/cohen_paper_label.html (last visited, May 25, 2004).
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As Jan Hunt, an education specialist has put it, “‘Labeling is
disabling’ because children believe what we tell them.”107
On the specific question of the relationship between labeling and
learning disabilities, Professor Bruce Winick is explicit:
Labeling the student as learning disabled may further this
tendency, but an individual who truly has a learning disability
may learn strategies and techniques to mitigate or overcome this
disability. If the student is labeled as incompetent at reading or
arithmetic, however, he or she may never again attempt these
activities with the degree of commitment and energy required to
master them.108

Other studies demonstrate that students who are deemed eligible to
receive special education services are “unnecessarily isolated,
stigmatized, and confronted with fear and prejudice.”109
Because of these potentially serious consequences, the IDEA
requires school administrators to make independent decisions as to
whether or not to conduct an evaluation to determine whether a child
is disabled for purposes of the IDEA. Parental consent must be

107. Jan
Hunt,
“Learning
Disability”:
A
Rose
by
Another
Name,
http://www.naturalchild.com/jan_hunt/learning.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
108. Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental
Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6, 19 (1995). For further discussion, see Cleveland v. Policy
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), and S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, The Interaction of the ADA,
the FMLA, and Workers’ Compensation: Why Can’t We be Friends?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 821 (2002–
2003) (Although an individual can benefit from the ADA, social security and workers’ compensation
concurrently, the differences in qualifications to gain the benefit and the subsequent benefits can create
adverse consequences.).
109. Losen & Welner, supra note 73, at 407. See also Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA: Shifting
Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1082
(2004–2005) (discussing House of Representatives Committee Report, H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 84, 98
(2003), that concluded that “the mislabeling of minority students has `significant adverse consequences’
because of the stigma attached to labeling a child with a disability, the decreased self-perception of the
labeled child, and the reduced curriculum that eligible children often receive”). On the “inevitability” of
stigma in a race-based context, see Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto,
1993 WIS. L. REV. 627, 725.
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obtained as a predicate to such actions.110 Further, as Professor
Glennon has explained:
Evaluations must meet numerous criteria designed to protect
against mistaken identifications. For example, evaluation data
must be collected by individuals with relevant training, and tests
and other evaluation materials must be tailored to assess specific
areas of educational need, such as reading and communication
skills. These statutory protections extend to the interpretation of
the data. A group of knowledgeable persons must consider
evaluation data in light of a variety of factors, including the
student’s social or cultural background, physical condition, and
any adaptive behavior. A child may be placed in special
education only if the team determines that (1) the child has one
or more of the listed disabilities; (2) the disability interferes with
educational performance; and (3) due to the disability, the child
needs special education.111

But there is another important side to all of this, and it is one that
requires serious attention. The OCS112 “take” on special education
and learning disabilities is radically different. To much of the public,
this labeling is a game, a game controlled by the wealthy and the
ambitious who, by manipulation and with the aid of conspiring
educational evaluators, are able to have their children labeled as
“LD” so as to “buy” them more time on tests (especially standardized
college board-type tests) to increase the likelihood that they will get
into more prestigious universities, and that, once at such universities,
will be given more time on exams and on standardized tests needed
for graduate schools (such as the law boards), thus improperly
enhancing their grade point averages and their chances of admission
110. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b) (1994). However, if a parent refuses consent, the school district can
initiate an administrative hearing process to seek an order requiring an evaluation. Id.
111. Glennon, Race, supra note 68, at 1248 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (1994), 20 U.S.C. §§
1412(5)(C), 1414(a)(5) (1994)); 34 C.F.R. § 300.533 (1994), and 34 C.F.R. § 533(b) (1994)).
112. See Sherwin, supra note 68, at 737; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 69, at 29; Perlin, A Law
of Healing, supra note 70, at 421–23.
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to a more prestigious law school or other graduate program.113 Beth
Robinson, who administers student-disability issues for the College
Board, has been quoted as saying, “And it doesn’t matter what test
you’re taking. If people can find a way to give their kid an
advantage, that family will do it, whether it’s the SAT or something
else.”114 Again, there are social and racial politics at play here.115 At
least one important critic has charged that the expansion of the
“learning disability” category serves as a means of creating “a
protective category for . . . white students or as a more ‘acceptable’
than labels of mental retardation or emotional disturbance for
students of color experiencing school difficulties”116 in a way that

113. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 86, at 1059 (discussing critique charging that disabilities law give
some a “competitive advantage”); id. at 1059 n.44 (conveying the allegations by some that “a little
learning disability can be an advantageous thing”). Due to differences in definitions between the ADA
and IDEA, students with a disability who did not receive services in primary and secondary school have
a greater chance of receiving services during higher education. Under the ADA, an individual is eligible
if he or she either has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) (2006). In contrast to the ADA, which uses broad terms to define impairment, the IDEA
specifically lists the impairments that are considered disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006).
On the significant differences (for funding purposes) between the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, see Garda, supra note 41, at 447 (“Because states receive no federal monies for children
eligible solely under [§] 504, there is arguably a strong incentive to over-identify children as IDEA
eligible.”).
114. Michael Scott Moore, Buying Time, available at http://archive.salon.com/books/it/2000/02/09/
test/print.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). There is no valid and reliable empirical evidence that the
perception that “gaming the system” actually “buys” an advantage for a test-taker without a disability,
but in this area, as in so many other areas of law, society and policy, the “vividness heuristic”
overwhelms the evidentiary database. See Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 69. On the pernicious role
of related perceptions in all of law school admissions, see Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post,
Misuse and Abuse of the LSAT: Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts and a Redefinition of
Merit, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 41, 93–94 (2006).
115. In Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the
IDEA did not categorically bar reimbursement of private-education tuition if a child had not previously
received special education and related services through the public school, and that it authorized
reimbursement of the costs of child’s private special-education services. On the multiple issues raised by
questions involving the interplay of special education and reimbursement for private education, see
Mark C. Weber, Services for Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural Regularity, 36 J.L.
& EDUC. 163 (2007).
116. Christine E. Sleeter, Radical Structuralist Perspectives on the Creation and Use of Learning
Disabilities, in DISABILITY & DEMOCRACY 153, 161–62 (Thomas M. Skrtic ed. 1995).
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allows white middle-class parents to obtain special benefits for their
children.117
For a period of time, the Educational Testing Service (ETS)
“flagged” test scores of students who received extra time on
exams.118 A panel of experts, however, found that this practice
“appear[ed] to single out and treat the group with learning disabilities
unequally, [and] diminish[ed] fair chances for college admission.”119
ETS eventually settled litigation, and agreed to stop flagging
exams.120
There is little question that the number of students in higher
education reporting learning disabilities, as a percentage of those
reporting any disability, continues to grow geometrically. In 1988,
16.1% of students with disabilities reported a learning disability. In
2001, the percentage more than doubled, rising to 40.1%, while at the
same time the number of students reporting other disabilities
declined.121 To many, this takes the form of evidence that “some
parents purposely take advantage of a learning disability label to give
117. Christine E. Sleeter, Learning Disabilities: The Social Construction of a Special Education
Category, 53 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 46, 47–48 (1986).
118. On ETS’s practice of “flagging,” see, for example, Nancy Leong, Beyond Breimhorst:
Appropriate Accomodation of Students with Learning Disabilities on the SAT, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2135,
2136–37 (2005). Compare Wong v. Regents of Univ. of California, 410 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Medical school applicant’s “reading comprehension scores, when allowed to read without time limits,
were at the 99.5 percentile, but under time constraints,” were at the eighth grade level.).
119. Noel Gregg et al., The Flagging Test Scores of Individuals with Disabilities Who Are Granted
the Accommodation of Extended Time: A Report of the Majority Opinion of the Blue Ribbon Panel on
Flagging, available at http://www.dralegal.org/downloads/cases/breimhorst/majority_report.txt (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009). See generally Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Fable of the Timed and Flagged LSAT:
Do Law School Admissions Committees Want the Tortoise or the Hare? 38 CUMB. L. REV. 33 (200809).
120. The flagging case—Breimhorst v. Educational Testing Service, No. C-99-3387, 2000 WL
34510621 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000)—is discussed extensively (and criticized) in Michael Edward
Slipsky, Flagging Accommodated Testing on the LSAT and MCAT: Necessary Protections of the
Academic Standards of the Legal and Medical Communities, 82 N.C. L. REV. 811 (2003-2004).
121. Suzanne Wilhelm, Accommodating Mental Disabilities in Higher Education: A Practical Guide
to ADA Requirements, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 217, 217–18 (2003) (citing AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., COLLEGE
FRESHMEN WITH DISABILITIES: A BIENNIAL STATISTICAL PROFILE 7 tbl.2 (2001). The author speculates
that among the possible reasons for the increase in students reporting learning disabilities was “the
relatively recent discovery of handicapping earning disabilities, such as dyslexia, dyscalculia,
dysgraphia, dyspraxia, Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD).” Id. at 218. As she notes further, “Learning disorders have always existed; they simply were
not recognized as disabilities requiring accommodations.” Id.
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their fast-track children a hand-up.”122 Other authors are more
malignant,123 referring to invokers of disability laws as
“opportunists,”124 or as “malingerers,”125 or “shameless shirkers,”126
and criticizing such laws as providing a “lifelong buffet of perks
[and] special breaks.”127 Others claim that “many students, possibly
goaded by their disappointed parents, simply fake their impairment in
order to get a free ride.”128 One critic in the popular press has
characterized learning disabilities as an “opportunistic tautology.”129
The reality, of course, is quite different. In the most important legal
challenge to a policy by which Boston University (BU) made
accommodations to students with learning disabilities:

122. Williams, supra note 54, at 662 n.226 (citing Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16).
123. So are some judges. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 354 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(charging, with no supporting evidence, that “nothing has changed” in over 300 years since Lord Hale
discussed “the easiness of counterfeiting [mental] disability”). Compare Perlin, Mirrors, supra note 91,
at 344 (characterizing this aspect of Justice Scalia’s opinion as a “pathetic recapitulation of [the] dreary
myth” reflected in the “fear of faking” by criminal defendants alleging mental disability). Valid and
reliable instruments that expose feigned malingering have been available to researchers for years, and
have been written about extensively in articles in databases that are readily available to Supreme Court
justices. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Explanatory Models of Malingering, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
543 (1994); Richard Rogers et al., Feigning Neuropsychological Impairment: A Critical Review of
Methodological and Clinical Considerations, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOG. REV. 255 (1993) (cited in
William Wilkinson, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Workers’ Compensation, 30 ARIZ. ATT’Y 28, 29
n.12 (April 1994)); Shayna Gothard et al., Detection of Malingering in Competency to Stand Trial
Evaluations, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493 (1995) (cited in, inter alia, David R. Katner, Raising Mental
Health Issues—Other than Insanity—in Juvenile Delinquency Defense, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, 90 n.101
(2000)).
124. Jessica Barth, Disability Benefits and the ADA after Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems,
75 IND. L.J. 1317, 1320 (2000) (citing John Leo, Let’s Lower the Bar, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct.
5, 1998, at 19).
125. See Ann Hubbard, A Military-Civilian Coalition for Disability Rights, 75 MISS. L.J. 975, 1000–
01 (2005–2006); see also supra note 123.
126. Michelle Stevens, High Court Must Define Disability, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 2, 1999, at 35.
127. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
239, 240 (2001) (quoting Shalit, supra note 122, at 16).
128. Samuel S. Heywood, Without Lowering the Bar: Eligibility for Reasonable Accommodations on
the Bar Exam for Learning Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 GA. L.
REV. 603, 633 (1998-1999) (quoting critics).
129. Susan M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating Learning-Disabled
Students and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41
AM. BUS. L.J. 145, 163 n.84 (2003) (quoting Shalit, supra note 122, at 16, 21).
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The court found that, not only were the university’s initial
policies toward students with learning disabilities based on
uninformed stereotypes, myths, and misconceptions, there was
not a single documented instance at BU in which a student with a
learning disability had fabricated a disorder to claim eligibility
for academic accommodations.130

In fact, the empirical research reveals this pattern:
Further, when given extra time, students with learning
disabilities score at comparable levels to students without
disabilities. But these studies also find that students without
disabilities do not improve their scores significantly when given
extra time. In contrast, students with learning disabilities who are
given extra time, although improving substantially from the
regularly-timed exam condition, still score lower than students
without disabilities given no extra time.131

Yet, the position of disparagement is still the one consonant with
the public’s OCS, and has served to malignantly contaminate the
debate and discourse over special education law. If the common
wisdom is right—which it definitely is not—then that would call into
question all of the theory and policy that led to the creation of special
education law. It would suggest that all special education law is a

130. Peter David Blanck, Civil Rights, Learning Disability, and Academic Standards, 2 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 33, 49 (1998) (emphasis added) (discussing the decision in Guckenberger v. Boston
Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997), which held that Boston University discriminated against
students with learning disabilities by establishing unreasonable eligibility criteria for qualifying as a
student with a learning disability; by not providing reasonable procedures for evaluating their requests
for academic accommodations; and by instituting a blanket policy precluding course substitutions in
foreign language and mathematics as academic accommodations). Cf. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 410 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005).
131. Blanck, supra note 130, at 49–50 (citing Elaine H. Alster, The Effects of Extended Time on
Algebra Test Scores for College Students with and Without Learning Disabilities, 30 J. LEARNING
DISABILITIES 222, 225 (1997), and M. Kay Runyan, The Effect of Extra Time on Reading
Comprehension Scores for University Students With and Without Learning Disabilities, 24 J. LEARNING
DISABILITIES 104, 108 (1991)) (emphasis added).
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pretext, and that, with regard to this population, at least, the remedial
and prophylactic aspects of IDEA are no more than a sham.
But when this position is examined critically, it reveals the same
sort of sanism that pervades all aspects of mental disability law.
Among the most common sanist myths132 are the myths that (1)
persons with mental disabilities are “faking”133 and (2) such persons
would not be mentally disabled if they only “tried harder.”134 The
“gaming take” on special education and learning disabilities plays
directly into these sanist myths in extremely troubling ways. In fact,
this entire controversy appears to be a textbook reflection of the
pernicious impact of the vividness heuristic.135 One vivid, negative
anecdote—perhaps even an apocryphal one with no basis in fact—
overwhelms an extensive contrary statistical database.136
CONCLUSION
We cannot meaningfully and coherently think seriously about the
special education/learning disability system without thinking about
stigma, and we cannot think seriously about stigma without
acknowledging its potential disparate impacts. I stated earlier that the
learning disability descriptor was a multi-edged sword;137 I have the
inchoate suspicion that there are even more dimensions to this puzzle
than I have been able to articulate here. But I believe that any
analysis of the question at hand must begin with an acknowledgment
of the complexity of the underlying social issues.
132. See generally Perlin, supra note 1, at 393–97.
133. See Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity Defense,
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375
(1996–1997).
134. See Perlin, supra note 66, at 8.
135. See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the
Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 536–37 (1993–1994). On the failures of the
vividness heuristic as a cognitive device, see Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in
Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 74–75 (2006–2007).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 112–14.
137. See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 51 (2006) (discussing how changes in IDEA law “are, at best,
double-edged”).
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Recall my discussions of sanism and pretextuality. Disability law
policy reflects sanism and pretextuality at every important juncture.
And this is no less so in matters of learning disabilities and special
education law. Labeled children are—via sanism—typified, slotted,
and stereotyped.138 Pretextuality—reflected in decision-making that
is infected by racial, class, and gender biases—dominates the entire
system. Society’s OCS—self-referential and non-reflective—lazily
relies on the vividness heuristic (by way of stories that appear to be
no more than “urban myths”) to shape the public’s views on difficult
and complicated issues. And we are left with a system that is, in
many important ways, stunningly incoherent.139
Earlier, I identified several pitfalls that must be considered if we
are to understand the underlying issues: problems of funding,
problems with the ways that mainstreaming is operationally done,
and problems with the creation of new stereotypes.140 Thinking about
these again, we are once more confronted with the impact of sanism
and pretextuality on each one of these “pitfalls.”141
Recall finally my reference to a Bob Dylan line in the title of this
paper today: “Simplify you, classify you.” This is precisely what we
do through our special education/learning disability system. We
simplify complicated issues and categorize children’s lives through
rigid classification schemes. And, in doing so, to continue with the
couplet in question, we also “deny [you]” and “defy [you].”142 We
deny the complexity of the issues, and we defy those—such as
138. On “slotting” in a related context, see Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and
Forensic Relationships, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 125 (1991) (The use of the typification heuristic by
which treating doctors slot “patients into certain categories, and prescribes a similar regimen for all.”).
139. See Perlin, supra note 3, at 3–5, 28–36 (concluding that mental disability law “is irrational and
incoherent, and this irrationality and incoherence disables civil commitment law, institutional treatment
law, civil rights law, and criminal procedure law”).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
141. Compare Weber, supra note 137, at 51 (“It is the vision of special education as something not all
that special which should be driving reform. The vision should be that of children with disabilities
whose progress is indistinguishable from that of their peers, due to intense and effective services and
accommodations not restricted by the hours of the ordinary school day or the strictures of traditional
educational programming. It is the vision of those children doing so, while mixed in with other children,
without any stigma imposed on those who learn in different ways or with additional support.”).
142. DYLAN, supra note 8.
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Professors Glennon or Blanck or Weber—who seek to explicate these
issues and to redefine them in socially progressive ways. All I really
want to do—as Dylan might have said—is to shed some new light on
the issue at hand. Perhaps then, we will take one step on the journey
of making meaningful education for all children with disabilities a
true and authentic reality.
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